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Non-technical Summary 
This paper investigates price formation in the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme 
(EU ETS). The aim of the paper is to know what is happening to the European Union 
Allowance (EUA) price, when new information hits the EU ETS. The focus lies on EUA 
prices reactions to the European Commission’s decisions (the EC’s decisions) on second 
National Allocation Plans (NAPs). Since prices should react only to unexpected information, 
a model of expectation-formation is provided, where agents anticipate the EC’s decision on 
second NAPs. An empirical analysis supports the model; unexpected allocations of emissions 
allowances leads to pronounced price reactions of the expected signs. Moreover, the 
adjustment is not instantaneous, but takes up to six hours after the decision announcement. 
The obtained results allow following conclusions. Our regression model is able to explain the 
EUA price reactions immediately after the publication of the EC’s decision on second NAPs. 
In particular, EUA prices adjust in the expected direction as a simple economic model of 
supply and demand would suggest. Hence, there is no evidence that EUA prices are 
disconnected from the considered fundamental factor, namely the overall supply of EUAs in 
the second commitment period. However, the slow adjustment of EUA prices to new 
information suggests that the EU ETS is not fully informationally efficient regarding the 
determination of the size of the overall cap. 
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Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
In dieser Arbeit wird die Preisbildung im europäischen Emissionshandel (EU ETS) 
untersucht. Der Schwerpunkt der Untersuchung liegt auf Preisreaktionen von CO2-
Zertifikaten, die unmittelbar nach Veröffentlichung der Entscheidung der Europäischen 
Kommission (EC) über die Höhe der zweiten Nationalen Allokationspläne (NAPs) erfolgen. 
Da Preise nur auf unerwartete Informationen reagieren sollten, wird ein 
Erwartungsbildungsmodell spezifiziert, in dem Agenten die Entscheidung der EC über die 
Höhe der zweiten Nationalen Allokationspläne prognostizieren. Eine empirische Überprüfung 
bestätigt das Modell – unerwartete Zuteilung von Emissionsberechtigungen führt zu 
ausgeprägten Preisreaktionen mit entsprechenden Vorzeichen. Zudem scheint die Anpassung 
der Preise auf neue Informationen langsam zu erfolgen. Auf der Basis einfacher 
Querschnittsregressionen dauert die Anpassung bis zu sechs Stunden. 
Die erzielten Ergebnisse erlauben folgende Schlussfolgerungen: Unser Regressionsmodel ist 
fähig die Preisreaktionen zu erfassen, die unmittelbar nach der Entscheidung der EC über die 
Höhe der zweiten NAPs stattfinden. Die Preise passen sich in die richtige Richtung an, so wie 
ein einfaches ökonomisches Model für Angebot und Nachfrage es nahelegt. Es gibt daher 
keine Anhaltspunkte für eine Loslösung der Preise von dem betrachteten fundamentalen 
Faktor, nämlich der Festsetzung des gesamten Angebots an Emissionsberechtigungen in der 
zweiten Verpflichtungsperiode. Die langsame Preisanpassung deutet allerdings darauf hin, 
dass die Preisbildung im EU ETS nicht vollständig informationseffizient hinsichtlich des 
betrachteten Faktors ist. 
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Abstract 
This paper empirically examines price formation in the European Union 
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). Our analysis shows that unexpected 
allocations of European Union Allowances (EUAs) lead to pronounced price 
reactions of the expected signs. Moreover, we find evidence that the adjustment of 
EUA prices to the European Commission’s decisions on second National 
Allocation Plans (NAPs) is not instantaneous, but takes up to six hours after the 
decision announcement. 
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1. Introduction 
As yet, little is known about the price formation in the European Union Emissions Trading 
Scheme (EU ETS). For example, it is not known whether the European Union Allowance 
(EUA) prices fully and correctly reflect all publicly available information. In this paper we 
employ the European Commission’s decisions (EC’s decisions) on second National 
Allocation Plans (NAPs) to analyse the EUA price reactions to new information. Related 
studies such as Mansanet-Bataller et al. (2007), Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo (2007), Alberola 
et al. (2008) and Chevallier (2009) provide first empirical evidence on the relation between 
fundamentals and price formation in the EU ETS. However, they do not focus on the impact 
of new information. This paper explicitly employs market expectations and high-frequency 
data and, therefore, is able to reveal novel aspects of price formation in the EU ETS. 
 
2. Model of Expectation-formation 
The EC’s decisions on NAPs play a key role in the determination of the size of the overall cap 
in the EU ETS (for details, see European Parliament and Council, 2003). In order to 
investigate the impact of the EC’s decisions on EUA prices we have to account for the 
expected component of each decision, since only unexpected information should affect prices. 
Our model of expectation-formation uses two facts about the approval of second NAPs. First, 
according to our investigation of the EU ETS framework, the study of related press releases, 
and interviews with market participants, it is widely accepted among market participants to 
treat the first NAPs as a point of reference for the second NAPs. Second, previous the first 
decision announcement, it was clear to all market participants that the EC will allow only 
tight caps in the second commitment period (for details, see e.g. Barosso, 2006a,b). Hence, 
for each member state i=1, 2, …, 27, we model the conditional market expectations with 
respect to the EC’s decision on the total number of EUAs in the second NAP,  |i iE y F  , as a 
function of iX , the total number of EUAs in the first NAP, 
  (1 )| ii i submitted
i
cut X
E y F
y
  
 
if (1 )
if (1 ) ,
submitted
i i
submitted
i i
y cut X
y cut X
  
    
where cut is a real constant between 0 and 1. cut can be considered as a lump cut from the 
first NAPs. submittediy  is the total number of EUAs in the second NAP of the member state i that 
has been submitted to the EC for approval. iy  represents the total number of EUAs in the 
second NAP that has been approved by the EC. iF   is the information set of all market 
participants before the considered decision that includes iX  and 
submitted
iy , but not iy . The 
conditional expectation is equal to the submitted number of EUAs, if cut leads to a greater or 
an equal number than submitted to the EC (our escape clause).1 
                                                 
1 Our escape clause assures rational expectations of market participants. It has to be included into the model, 
because of the strong aim of the EC to tighten the national totals in the second commitment period and the fact 
that member states have an incentive to be generous with their allocation. 
- 3 - 
In order to test for which values of cut our model delivers unbiased expectations, we regress 
iy  on the above expectations for several choices of cut (0.00, 0.025, 0.05, 0.075, 0.10). The 
results indicate no expectation bias. In particular, the estimated intercept is not statistically 
significantly different from zero in all regressions. The estimated slope coefficient is close to 
and not significantly different from one. The coefficient of determination is in all cases above 
0.995. A joint test of the null that the intercept is zero and the slope is one cannot be rejected 
at the usual significance levels in all regressions. Thus, the stated expectation-formation leads 
to no systematic deviations from the realized values for reasonable values of cut. We report 
results for cut equal 7.5 per cent. This choice is justified by the calculations presented later in 
the paper. However, the results are qualitatively similar for other values of cut. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
 
3.1. Price and Announcement Data 
We use price data for the ICE ECX EUA December 2008 futures contract, which is the most 
liquid futures contract in the period of interest. The high-frequency price data are obtained 
from the ICE Futures/European Carbon Exchange (ECX), the leading exchange for trading in 
EUA futures. After correcting for outliers, we calculate equidistant prices for each 10-minute 
interval during the trading session as the mean of the preceding and immediately following 
transaction prices. A detailed description of the data is available in Rotfuß (2009).2 
The announcement data, especially the number of approved EUAs in the first and second 
NAPs, are gathered from the EC’s website and the relevant press releases. The publication 
time of the EC’s decisions is taken from Point Carbon, a well-known news agency among EU 
ETS participants. In several cases the EC approved the second NAPs on the condition that 
changes are made to the total number of emission allowances. In a few cases the EC proposed 
informal emission caps, which the member states either accepted or dismissed by withdrawal 
of the proposed NAP shortly before the decision. There are in total 36 announcements on 
second NAPs: 27 (conditional) approvals, six decisions on amended and resubmitted NAPs, 
and three information leakages – publications of the EC’s decisions before the announcement 
of the actual decision. We focus only on the 27 (conditional) approvals that were made in the 
period from 11/29/2006 to 10/26/2007, but account for the information leakages (relevant in 
the case of Germany and Belgium) to avoid measurement errors arising from stale 
information.3 We account for the information leakages by replacing the calculated 
expectations for Germany and Belgium with the leaked out values. Due to low liquidity at the 
beginning of the considered announcement period and the rapid succession of the 
announcements on four days, it is not possible to measure the effect of each announcement 
                                                 
2 The average EUA price in the period of interest (11/29/2006 – 10/26/2007) equals 19.92 Euro. 
3 The announcement data can be provided by the authors upon request. Note that 27 decisions were made on 14 
days. Ten of these decisions were made on a single day. There are also two days each with two decisions and one 
day with three decisions. The remaining ten announcements were made on separate days. 
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separately. Instead, 17 announcements that occurred on four trading days are summarized into 
four (compiled) announcements to have only one announcement per trading day. The 
calculation of the relevant quantities occurs in a straightforward fashion; the time stamps of 
the first announcements on the four trading days are assigned to the four compiled 
announcements. The other quantities are defined as the sum of their respective individual 
counterparts. After doing so, we are left with 14 announcements that we employ in our 
regressions. 
 
3.2. Methodology 
We use simple cross-sectional methods similar to Almeida et al. (1998) to assess the EC’s 
decisions on second NAPs on the EUA prices. If the proposed expectation-formation in 
Section 2 is correct, then the surprise component should be able to explain the price changes 
immediately after the announcements. The central equation that we use in our empirical 
analysis is given by the following formula, 
 
i it t i t t
r S       , 
 
where 
it t
r   is defined as the difference of two EUA prices, i it t tp p  .4 it  represents the first 
equidistant 10-minute interval after the considered announcement i has reached the market. 
t  is defined as the elapsed time after it  measured in minutes and it t   is the appropriate 
error term. The surprise component iS  is defined as  |i i i iS E y F y  , which is simply the 
difference between the expected and the approved number of EUAs in the second NAP of the 
member state i . The standard deviation of iS  equals almost 6 million EUAs, the maximum 
and minimum values are 12.7 and -19.3 million EUAs, respectively. A positive (negative) Si 
implies an unexpected cut (over-allocation) of the national total. The investigation of price 
reactions is performed for several values of t . In particular, in the first step we fix t  at the 
time period between the announcement instant and the closure of the trading session (what 
leads to i it T t   , where T equals the point in time of the trading session closure)5, and in 
the second step at 10, 20, …, 480 minutes. 
If the model of expectation-formation is sufficiently accurate, the estimate of   should be 
positive and significant, since a positive surprise implies a reduction of supply of EUAs. The 
estimate of  , on the other hand, should be small and statistically not different from zero, 
since only surprises should contain new information. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
                                                 
4  All results are robust to the use of logarithmic price changes rather than absolute price changes as the 
dependent variable.  
5 The average time between the announcement instant and the closure of the trading session equals 361 minutes. 
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The empirical results are presented in Table 1 und Figure 1. In particular, unexpected cuts 
lead to price increases and unexpected over-allocation to price decreases. An unexpected cut 
of 1 million EUAs leads to an EUA price increase of 4.6 Euro cents when we consider price 
changes between the announcement instant and the closure of the trading session ( it  = T- ti), 
see Table 1. The effect is significant given its t-value of 5.3. The 95 per cent confidence 
interval of the impact ranges from 2.7 to 6.4 Euro cents. The estimated constant equals 1 Euro 
cent, which we consider to be not statistically different from zero due to its significance level 
of almost 15 per cent. Finally, our model seems to explain the variation of considered EUA 
price changes fairly well – the coefficient of determination equals 70 per cent. 
Turning the focus to time periods up to 480 minutes after the announcement instant reveals a 
graduate adjustment of the EUA prices to new information. As the estimate of   in the upper 
part of Figure 1 suggests, an unexpected cut of 1 million EUAs leads to a price increase of 2 
Euro cents within 60 minutes after the announcement instant. Moreover, the impact is not 
only positive, but also statistically significant. Of course, this price adjustment is not 
necessarily slow for a new market. However, further estimation results for longer time periods 
reveal an adjustment within six hours: Beginning at 160 minutes after the announcement 
instant, the price adjustment increases from 2 Euro cents, within 190 minutes to 4.9 Euro 
cents. Shortly thereafter, the impact of the surprises becomes insignificant, but remains at the 
same level. For the same time intervals up to eight hours after the announcements instant, the 
estimate of   is small and, what is more important, in most cases not statistically different 
from zero (see lower part of Figure 1). 
If we assume that market participants are to some extent not rational and drop our escape 
clause in the stated expectation-formation model, then we are able to estimate cut by simply 
regressing iy  on iX . In this case, the estimated slope coefficient equals 1-cut and the 
residuals can be regarded as surprises or forecasting errors. The obtained estimate of 1-cut 
equals 0.919 and is statistically different from one, suggesting a value of 8.1 per cent for cut, 
which is not that far from the value of 7.5 per cent. The estimate is significant at all 
reasonable levels and its 95 per cent confidence interval spans the set of real numbers from 
0.900 to 0.939. The estimated impact of calculated forecasting errors on the EUA price 
changes amounts to 3.3 Euro cents and is also significant. The appropriate 95 per cent 
confidence interval includes all real values from 1.5 to 5.0 Euro cents. 
The overall pattern of the estimated impact does not change when we consider other values of 
cut between 0 and 10 per cent. In most cases, the estimated impact of the surprises is positive 
and significant and exhibits a gradual increase. Again, the random fluctuations of EUA prices 
do not become evident until six hours after the announcement instant. The significance is 
smaller in most cases for the more extreme choices of cut. The estimated intercept is small 
and insignificant in most regressions when measuring price changes over intervals up to eight 
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hours. Therefore, the results seem to be robust across different post-announcement intervals 
and reasonable lump cut values. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Based on our results we can draw the following conclusions. Our regression model is able to 
explain the EUA price reactions immediately after the publication of the EC’s decision on 
second NAPs. In particular, EUA prices adjust in the expected direction as a simple economic 
model of supply and demand would suggest. Hence, and contrary to Mansanet-Bataller and 
Pardo (2007), there is no evidence that EUA prices are disconnected from the considered 
fundamental factor, namely the overall supply of EUAs in the second commitment period. 
However, the slow adjustment of EUA prices to new information suggests that the EU ETS is 
not fully informationally efficient regarding the determination of the size of the overall cap. 
Several open questions remain for further research. First of all, the investigation of the 
relation between other fundamentals and EUA prices at high-frequency, e.g. oil, coal, gas, or 
electricity prices, deserves a thorough analysis. Another question is the reason for the slow 
adjustment of EUA prices to new information. It might be that the slow adjustment to new 
information is simply one of the teething problems of the EU ETS. It might be, however, that 
the structure of the EU ETS produces impediments to adjustment. 
 
Acknowledgements 
This paper has benefited from comments by Jürgen Kähler and Francois Laisney. We thank 
Qingwei Wang, Christian D. Dick, Svitlana Voronkova, and participants at the ZEW Macro-
Finance Seminar for their numerous suggestions. We thank also Carl J. Ullrich and other 
participants at the 36th Annual EFA Meeting (2009, Bergen) for their valuable comments and 
suggestions. One anonymous reviewer of the first version of this paper provided important 
suggestions for further research. 
 
References 
Alberola, E., J. Chevallier, and B. Chèze, 2008, Price Drivers and Structural Breaks in 
European Carbon Prices 2005 – 2007, Energy Policy, 36 (2), 787-797. 
Almeida, A., C. Goodhart, and R. Payne, 1998, The Effects of Macroeconomic News on High 
Frequency Exchange Rate Behavior, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 
33 (3), 383-408. 
Barroso, J.M., 2006a, Changement Climatique et Énergie: La Détermination De L’Europe, La 
Tribune, 21.11.2006. 
Barroso, J.M., 2006b, The Scottish Enlightenment and the Challenges for Europe in the 21st 
Century; Climate Changes and Energy, Enlightenment Lectures Series, Edinburgh 
University, 28.11.2006. 
Chevallier, J., 2009, Carbon Futures and Macroeconomic Risk Factors: A View From the EU 
ETS, Energy Economics, 31 (4), 614-625. 
European Parliament and Council, 2003, Directive 2003/87/EC of the Eruopean Parliament 
and of the Council of 13 October 2003. Official Journal of the European Union L 
275, 32-46. 
Mansanet-Bataller, M. and T. Pardo, 2007, The Effects of National Allocation Plans on 
Carbon-Markets, Working Paper, Faculty of Economics, University of Valencia. 
- 7 - 
Mansanet-Bataller, M., A. Pardo, and E. Valor, 2007, CO2 Prices, Energy and Weather, The 
Energy Journal, 28 (3), 67-86. 
Rotfuß, W., 2009, Intraday Price Formation and Volatility in the European Union Emissions 
Trading Scheme: An Introductory Analysis, ZEW Discussion Paper 09-018, 
Mannheim. 
 
Appendix 
 
Table 1: The impact of the EC’s decisions on EUA price changes measured over a fixed period 
Dependent variable: EUA price changes 
 Coef. Std. Error t P>|t| 95% Confidence-Interval 
  -0.099 0.064 -1.550 0.147 -0.239 0.040 
  0.046 0.009 5.320 0.000 0.027 0.064 
Overall-F-Test Coefficient of determination Number of observations 
F(1,12)=28.33; Prob > F = 0.0002 R2 = 0.70 Nobs = 14 
The dependent variable is the EUA price change between the announcement instant and the closing of the 
trading session; the independent variable is the unexpected information Si (for definition, see Section 3.2). The 
value of cut equals 7.5%. 
 
Figure 1: The impact of the EC’s decisions on EUA price changes measured over several periods 
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The figure presents the estimates of   (upper) and  (lower), both indicated by the solid line, and their 
corresponding 95 per cent confidence intervals (dotted lines) from the regression of EUA price changes over 
several time periods (indicated by the x-axis) on the unexpected information Si (for more details, see Section 
3.2). The time intervals are measured in minutes after the announcement instant. The value of cut equals 7.5%. 
